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Yasser Arafat is a historic figure and a tragic figure.  He is a historic figure because at a 
time when the Palestinian people had lost their land, their identity, their leadership, and 
were ignored or considered an irritant by the world community, he told them that they did 
exist, that they were not just refugees but a national people, that they would survive and 
they would return from exile to their homeland.  He gave them hope at a time when they 
had little reason to hope.  In his body and in his indomitable spirit, he symbolized the 
determination of the Palestinian people to survive.  For this reason, he is rightly 
considered the father of his people.  His death  produced  sincere mourning and grief.   
 
Arafat is a tragic figure because the very qualities that enabled him to keep a divided 
people together—the ability to equivocate, to imply all things to all people, to maneuver 
without taking a position that burned bridges—made him a terrible negotiator.  To be 
sure he had difficult partners in Netanyahu and Barak, but no one can deny his own role 
in the failure of the negotiation process.  Like Moses, who stood on the mountain and 
looked into the Promised Land but was never able to cross over, Arafat sat a few miles 
from Jerusalem but never worshipped in the mosque there.  
 
Arafat was lionized by Palestinians because during negotiations he refused to buckle 
under intense Israeli and American pressure.  He insisted that the 1967 boundary be the 
basis of negotiations,  that Israeli annexations be replaced with compensatory transfers, 
that East Jerusalem be the sovereign capital of Palestine, that the Islamic holy sites  be 
under Palestinian sovereignty, and that the refugees have the right to return to their state 
without Israeli restrictions.  All of these principles were ultimately accepted by the 
Israelis at the Taba talks in January, 2001, just on the eve of Ariel Sharon’s election.  He 
also prepared the Palestinian people for the fact that Israel was a permanent entity and 
that they would have to settle for a Palestinian state, not all of Palestine.  In the face of 
great pressure, he never deviated from this position.  Palestinian negotiators  accepted 
changes in the 1967 boundary, accepted that most Jewish settlements would remain,  and 
accepted the partition of East Jerusalem.  All of these were major and painful concessions 
on the Palestinian side.  They  set the stage for the parameters of an ultimate  Israeli-
Palestinian negotiated settlement, if one is possible at this point. .   
 
Arafat’s leadership of the Palestinian Authority was controversial, to say the least.   His 
ambiguous and equivocal positions in the current Intifada--whether or not he was 
encouraging suicide bombings--were particularly criticized.  As that conflict spiraled out 
of control and produced over 4,000 fatalities (three-quarters of them Palestinian, most 
being civilian on both  sides),  many within the Palestinian leadership criticized him.   His 
international reputation was seriously scarred, Israeli public opinion was hardened, and 
the Israeli peace camp was marginalized and discredited.  In terms of governance,  Arafat 
was a terrible administrator whose regime was corrupt.  Large amounts of money 
disappeared on his watch.  Part of the missing money might have been presidential 
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discretionary funds, but a fortune was diverted to his wife and his cronies.  This 
compromised the ability of the Palestinian Authority to function and did severe harm to 
the Palestinian people, who are suffering greatly.  Arafat  was also autocratic and  
authoritarian.  He did not see the democratic impulses in Palestinian society as an asset 
but worked to undermine them.  The Palestinians—both the elite and the  public--were  
frustrated and bitter. Some openly resisted him.  We should not forget that the first 
‘intifada’ (uprising) was in the 1980s in Lebanon against Arafat’s leadership.  
 
There will be a transitional collective leadership following Arafat.  All of the potential 
leaders are strongly committed to a negotiated settlement based upon the parameters 
contained in the Clinton proposal (December, 2000) and the Taba Talks (January, 2001).  
Two of these personalities are military leaders (Rajoub and Dahlan) and two are political 
leaders without a popular base (Mahmud Abbas/Abu Mazen and Ahmed Qureia/Abu 
Ala).    The one person on that leadership list who has integrity, courage, a commitment 
to negotiations, resistance credibility, and a popular base is Marwan Barghouti.  He is in 
an Israeli prison serving five life sentences for directing the Tanzim, the Palestinian 
militia.  Barghouti could unite the Palestinians and could sign an agreement.  Whoever 
emerges as the leader will be a solid and determined negotiating partner. 
 
Now that Arafat is gone, there is an opportunity to reopen negotiations. Mr. Sharon and 
President Bush have said there was no Palestinian partner.  Sharon demonized Arafat 
beyond his human limitations.    It is not clear if this stated concern about Arafat was the 
true reason  for not continuing talks since January, 2001 or if it was just an excuse.  
Sharon has long been a passionate opponent of any negotiated settlement, but the past 
four years of bloodshed, and the potential for more in the future, may well have forced a 
reassessment.  If Sharon and Bush want a settlement, there is an opportunity.  Majorities 
of the Israeli and Palestinian publics would support them (although some would resist).  
 
The Palestinian authorities have been negotiating with Hamas and other militant groups 
to ensure a peaceful transition and to avoid intra-Palestinian conflicts.  They are also 
trying to bring Fatah dissident Farouk Kaddoumi on board.  If these  should  join a 
coalition government (or even acquiesce),  this  would be a major breakthrough that 
would stabilize the situation and create a strong Palestinian negotiating front.  
 
There will be great pressure from world leaders  for President Bush to appoint a high-
profile negotiator to re-open talks.  The President would be expected to put his own 
reputation on the line for these talks.  Bush is very resistant to this.  His instincts are 
closer to Sharon than to the Palestinians and he is also hesitant to get involved, having 
seen how President Clinton was burned by his efforts. However, this conflict is the single 
most dangerous situation in the world today.  It is a swamp of despond that is 
empowering   the most violent and intemperate impulses among both Jews and 
Palestinians, not to mention the larger Islamic world (and perhaps even within our own 
country).   It is a breeding ground for violent extremists on all sides.  The American 
security interest, not to mention the interests of the wider world, may compel the 
Americans to lead a new effort for a settlement.  If we try to do this on our own, 
bypassing our allies and the world community, it will fail.             
